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February 14, 2003: The following analysis was written
by Glen Rangwala, Lecturer in Politics at Cambridge
University.
This page reviews the evidence presented by Hans Blix
(UNMOVIC) and Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA) to the Security
Council on 14 February 2003, and contrasts it to the
claims of Colin Powell to the Security Council on 5
February and Tony Blair in a dossier of 2 February.
Links to the original documents are at the end of this
page.
1. GENERAL
CLAIM
Powell: "The gravity of this moment is matched
by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction pose to the world."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such
weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions,
which should have been declared and destroyed."
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2. COMPLIANCE with INSPECTIONS
a) CLAIM
Blair dossier, p.3: "Journeys are monitored by
security officers stationed on the route if they have
prior intelligence. Any changes of destination are notified
ahead by telephone or radio so that arrival is anticipated.
The welcoming party is a give away."
Powell: "This sequence of events raises the worrisome
suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming
inspections at Taji"
EVIDENCE
Blix: "Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted
more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites.
All inspections were performed without notice, and access
was almost always provided promptly. In no case have
we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew
in advance that the inspectors were coming."
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b) CLAIM
Blair dossier, p.3: "Escorts are trained, for
example, to start long arguments with other Iraqi officials
‘on behalf of UNMOVIC’ while any incriminating
evidence is hastily being hidden behind the scenes."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "we note that access to sites has so far
been without problems, including those that had never
been declared or inspected, as well as to Presidential
sites and private residences."
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3. 'COMPLIANCE on SUBSTANCE'
a) CLAIM
Powell: "We believe Saddam Hussein knows what
he did with [chemical weapons] and he has not come clean
with the international community. We have evidence these
weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from
Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "a letter of 12 February from Iraq’s
National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance.
It presents a list of 83 names of participants 'in the
unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which
took place in the summer of 1991'. As the absence of
adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains
an important reason why quantities of chemicals have
been deemed 'unaccounted for', the presentation of a
list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions
appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance."
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b) CLAIM
Blair dossier, p.2: "The Regime has intensified
efforts to hide documents in places where they are unlikely
to be found, such as private homes of low-level officials
and universities."
Powell: "Thanks to intelligence they were provided,
the inspectors recently found dramatic confirmation
of these reports. When they searched the homes of an
Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000
pages of documents. You see them here being brought
out of the home and placed in UN hands. Some of the
material is classified and related to Iraq's nuclear
program."
EVIDENCE
ElBaradei: "The IAEA has completed a more detailed
review of the 2000 pages of documents found on 16 January
at the private residence of an Iraqi scientist. The
documents relate predominantly to lasers, including
the use of laser technology to enrich uranium. [...]
While the documents have provided some additional details
about Iraq's laser enrichment development efforts, they
refer to activities or sites already known to the IAEA
and appear to be the personal files of the scientist
in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in
the documents alters the conclusions previously drawn
by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq's laser enrichment
programme."
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c) CLAIM
Powell: "Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor
the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament
-- not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but
to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "The Iraqi side also informed us that the
commission, which had been appointed in the wake of
our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had
had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing
proscribed items. This was welcomed. A second commission,
we learnt, has now been appointed with the task of searching
all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination
of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by
the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and
is to have very extensive powers of search in industry,
administration and even private houses."
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4. CONCEALMENT?
a) CLAIM
Powell: "you will see the type of concealment
activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption
of inspections. [...] We must ask ourselves: Why would
Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections
if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or
did not have?"
EVIDENCE
Blix: "intelligence has led to sites where no
proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however,
inspection of these sites were useful in proving the
absence of such items and in some cases the presence
of other items conventional munitions. It showed
that conventional arms are being moved around the country
and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons
of mass destruction."
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b) CLAIM
Powell: "This one is about a weapons munition
facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place
called Taji. This is one of about 65 such facilities
in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions.
[...] Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and
red outlines. The four that are in red squares represent
active chemical munitions bunkers. [...] Now look at
the picture on the right. You are now looking at two
of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are
gone, the tents are gone. It's been cleaned up. And
it was done on the 22nd of December as the UN inspection
team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles
arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the
right. The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get
there. They found nothing."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "The presentation of intelligence information
by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had
prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing
evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like
to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with,
namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for
chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This
was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the
sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have
noted that the two satellite images of the site were
taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of
munitions at the site could just as easily have been
a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions
in anticipation of imminent inspection."
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5. The EFFECTIVENESS of INSPECTIONS
a) CLAIM
Powell: "The pattern is not just one of reluctant
cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation.
What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any
meaningful inspection work."
EVIDENCE
ElBaradei: "The Government of Iraq reiterated
last week its commitment to comply with its Security
Council obligations and to provide full and active co-operation
with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq making
good on this commitment, the above measures will contribute
to the effectiveness of the inspection process."
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b) CLAIM
Powell: "Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks
among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel
the roads of Iraq every single day. It took the inspectors
four years to find out that Iraq was making biological
agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors
to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming
forward as they are supposed to with the information
about these kinds of capabilities."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "It is our intention to examine the possibilities
for surveying ground movements, notably by trucks. In
the face of persistent intelligence reports for instance
about mobile biological weapons production units, such
measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections."
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6. INTERVIEWS
a) CLAIM
Powell: "The regime only allows interviews with
inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder."
EVIDENCE
ElBaradei: "The IAEA has continued to interview
key Iraqi personnel. We have recently been able to conduct
four interviews in private - that is, without the presence
of an Iraqi observer."
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b) CLAIM
Powell: "Iraq did not meet its obligations under
1441 to provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated
with its weapons of mass destruction programs."
EVIDENCE
ElBaradei: "In response to a request by the IAEA,
Iraq has expanded the list of relevant Iraqi personnel
to over 300, along with their current work locations.
The list includes the higher-level key scientists known
to the IAEA in the nuclear and nuclear related areas."
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7. WEAPONS and FACILITIES
a) CLAIM
Powell: "These quantities of chemical weapons
are now unaccounted for. [...] Saddam Hussein has chemical
weapons."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq
provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of
chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One
must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."
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b) CLAIM
Powell: "As part of this effort, another little
piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand
that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice
the dramatic difference in size between the test stand
on the left, the old one, and the new one on the right.
Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the flame
from the engine comes out. The exhaust vent on the right
test stand is five times longer than the one on the
left. The one of the left is used for short-range missiles.
The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range
missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. This photograph
was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand
has been finished and a roof has been put over it so
it will be harder for satellites to see what's going
on underneath the test stand."
EVIDENCE
Blix: "The experts also studied the data on the
missile engine test stand that is nearing completion
[...]. So far, the test stand has not been associated
with a proscribed activity."
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c) CLAIM
Powell: "it strikes me as quite odd that these
[aluminium] tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that
far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets.
Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons
to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so.
EVIDENCE
ElBaradei: "Iraq has been asked to explain the
reasons for the tight tolerance specifications that
it had requested from various suppliers. Iraq has provided
documentation related to the project for reverse engineering
and has committed itself to providing samples of tubes
received from prospective suppliers."
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d) CLAIM
Powell: "Intercepted communications from mid-2000
through last summer showed that Iraq front companies
sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas
centrifuge rotors. [...] there is no doubt in my mind.
These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein
is very much focused on putting in place the key missing
piece from his nuclear weapons program".
EVIDENCE
ElBaradei: "IAEA inspectors found a number of
documents relevant to transactions aimed at the procurement
of carbon fibre, a dual-use material used by Iraq in
its past clandestine uranium enrichment programme for
the manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our review
of these documents suggests that the carbon fibre sought
by Iraq was not intended for enrichment purposes, as
the specifications of the material appear not to be
consistent with those needed for manufacturing rotor
tubes. In addition, we have carried out follow-up inspections,
during which we have been able to observe the use of
such carbon fibre in non-nuclear-related applications
and to take samples."
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References:
Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, "Briefing
to the Security Council" (14 February 2003), at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, "The
Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq" (14 February
2003), at:
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml
Tony Blair, "Iraq - its infrastructure of concealment,
deception and intimidation" (2 February 2003),
via:
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7111.asp
Secretary of State Colin Powell, "Remarks to The
United Nations Security Council" (5 February 2003),
at:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm
For more detailed analysis of the evidence for the
claims by the US and UK governments, see "Claims
and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons",
at:
http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.html
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