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February 5, 2003
by Glen Rangwala
Lecturer in Politics at Cambridge University
At end of commentary, see Links to related material
on fake Dossier.
In preparation for Powell's presentation at 15:30 GMT
today, I had a look at the third British government's
"dossier" released last Thursday, "Iraq
- Its Infrastructure Of Concealment, Deception And Intimidation"
(30 January 2003). (References below to page numbers
relate to the downloadable Word version).
The document claims to draw "upon a number of
sources, including intelligence material" (p.1,
first sentence).
Now this is a bit misleading.
More precisely, the bulk of the 19-page document (pp.6-16)
is directly copied without acknowledgement from an article
in last September's Middle East Review of International
Affairs entitled "Iraq's Security and Intelligence
Network: A Guide and Analysis".
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a1.html
The author of the piece is Ibrahim al-Marashi, a postgraduate
student at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
He has confirmed to me that his permission was not sought;
in fact, he didn't even know about the British document
until I mentioned it to him.
It's quite striking that even Marashi's typographical
errors and anomalous uses of grammar are incorporated
into the Downing Street document. For example, on p.13,
the British dossier incorporates a misplaced comma:
"Saddam appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri
as head"..
Likewise, Marashi's piece also states:
"Saddam appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri
as head"..
The other sources that are extensively plagiarised
in the document are two authors from Jane's Intelligence
Review:
Ken Gause (an international security analyst from Alexandria,
Virginia), "Can the Iraqi Security Apparatus save
Saddam" (November 2002), pp.8-13.
Sean Boyne, "Inside Iraq's Security Network",
in 2 parts during 1997.
None of the sources are acknowledged, leading the reader
to believe that the information is a result of direct
investigative work, rather than simply copied from pre-existing
internet sources.
The fact that the texts of these three authors are copied
directly results in a proliferation of different transliterations
(eg different spellings of Ba'th, depending on which
author is being copied).
There are two types of changes incorporated into the
British document. Firstly, numbers are increased or
are rounded up. So, for example, the section on "Fedayeen
Saddam" (pp.15-16) is directly copied from Boyne,
almost word for word. The only substantive difference
is that Boyne estimates the personnel of the organisation
to be 18,000-40,000 (Gause similarly estimates 10-40,000).
The British dossier instead writes "30,000 to 40,000".
A similar bumping up of figures occurs with the description
of the Directorate of Military Intelligence.
The second type of change in the British dossier is
that it replaces particular words to make the claim
sound stronger. So, for example, most of p.9 on the
functions of the Mukhabarat is copied directly from
Marashi's article, except that when Marashi writes of
its role in:
"monitoring foreign embassies in Iraq"
this becomes in the British dossier:
"spying on foreign embassies in Iraq".
Similarly, on that same page, whilst Marashi writes
of the Mukhabarat:
"aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes"
- the British dossier renders this as:
"supporting terrorist organisations in hostile
regimes".
Furher examples from the section on "Fedayeen
Saddam" include a reference to how, in Boyne's
original text, its personnel are "recruited from
regions loyal to Saddam", referring to their original
grouping as "some 10,000-15,000 'bullies and country
bumpkins.'"
This becomes in the British government's text a reference
to how its personnel are:
"press ganged from regions known to be loyal to
Saddam" ... "some 10,000-15,000 bullies."
Clearly, a reference to the "country bumpkins"
would not have the rhetorical effect that the British
government was aiming for.
Finally, there is one serious substantive mistake in
the British text, in that it muddles up Boyne's description
of General Security (al-Amn al-Amm), and places it in
its section on p.14 of Military Security (al-Amn al-Askari).
The result is complete confusion: it starts on p.14
by relating how Military Security was created in 1992
(in a piece copied from Marashi), then goes onto talk
about the movement of its headquarters - in 1990 (in
a piece copied from Boyne on the activities of General
Security). The result is that it gets the description
of the Military Security Service wholly wrong, claiming
that its head is Taha al-Ahbabi (whilst really he was
head of General Security in 1997; Military Security
was headed by Thabet Khalil).
Apart from the obvious criticism that the British government
has plagiarised texts without acknowledgement, passing
them off as the work of its intelligence services, there
are two further serious problems.
Firstly, it indicates that the UK at least really does
not have any independent sources of information on Iraq's
internal politics - they just draw upon publicly available
data. Thus any further claims to information based on
"intelligence data" must be treated with even
more scepticism.
Secondly, the information presented as being an accurate
statement of the current state of Iraq's security organisations
may not be anything of the sort. Marashi - the real
and unwitting author of much of the document
has as his primary source the documents captured in
1991 for the Iraq Research and Documentation Project.
His own focus is the activities of Iraq's ntelligence
agencies in Kuwait, Aug90-Jan91 - this is the subject
of his hesis. As a result, the information presented
as relevant to how Iraqi agencies are currently engaged
with Unmovic is 12 years old.
For reference, here are a few other summary comments
on the British document.
Official authors are (in Word > Properties) P. Hamill,
J. Pratt, A. Blackshaw, and M. Khan.
p.1 is the summary.
pp.2-5 are a repetition of Blix's comments to the Security
Council on the difficulties they were encountering,
with further claims about the activities of al-Mukhabarat.
These are not backed up, eg the claim that car crashes
are organised to prevent the speedy arrival of inspectors.
p.6 is a simplified version of Marashi's diagram at:
http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/pdfs/iraqint.pdf
p.7 is copied (top) from Gause (on the Presidential
Secretariat), and (middle and bottom) from Boyne (on
the National Security Council).
p.8 is entirely copied from Boyne (on the National Security
Council).
p.9 is copied from Marashi (on al-Mukhabarat), except
for the final section, which is insubstantial.
p.10 is entirely copied from Marashi (on General Security),
except for the final section, which is insubstantial.
p.11 is entirely copied from Marashi (on Special Security),
except for the top section (on General Security), which
is insubstantial.
p.12 is entirely copied from Marashi (on Special Security).
p.13 is copied from Gause (on Special Protection) and
Marashi (Military Intelligence).
p.14 is wrongly copied from Boyne (on Military Security)
and from Marashi (on the Special Republican Guard).
p.15 is copied from Gause and Boyne (on al-Hadi project
/ project 858).
pp.15-16 is copied from Boyne (on Fedayeen Saddam).
A final section, on the Tribal Chiefs' Bureau, seems
to be copied from a different piece by Cordesman.
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