In early September 1996, the civil war between rival Kurdish factions in northern Iraq suddenly escalated as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), aided by the Iraqi army, attacked the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and drove it into Iran. The Clinton Administration responded with a salvo of cruise missiles that struck Iraqi military targets throughout the country, but the U.S. assault had little effect on the new political reality in Iraqi Kurdistan. Five years after losing both the Gulf War and control over the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Saddam Hussein had succeeded in reasserting his power over the region.

Despite this setback for American foreign policy, there exists an opportunity for the Administration to formulate a strategy that will bring long-term stability to Iraqi Kurdistan and adjacent areas. However, failure to implement such a strategy could have grave consequences for American and Western interests.

The most obvious consequence is that Saddam Hussein will retain northern Iraq despite American opposition, thereby damaging U.S. prestige in the Middle East, while bolstering that of Hussein. This may encourage Iraq to challenge the United States in other regions, which could lead to continual armed confrontations, massive refugee movements. or even an all-out resumption of the Gulf War.

An equally undesirable consequence is the exacerbation of the Kurdish question for Iraq's neighbors, especially Turkey. Since 1984 Turkey has faced an increasingly serious internal crisis from Kurdish separatists, prompting it to launch raids on Iraqi Kurdistan in an effort to destroy bases of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). This has damaged Ankara's relations with Western Europe and to a lesser extent the United States, but the Kurdish question has also begun to undermine Turkish stability. Left unchecked, observers warn that Turkey's Western-oriented political system could collapse or degenerate into a civil war on the scale of that in the former Yugoslavia[1] Such an event would obviously bode ill for American policy in the Near East, while seriously weakening the southern flank of NATO.

American policy objectives for Iraqi Kurdistan must therefore take into account not only Iraq, but its neighbors as well. Such a task must have as its goal the creation of a stable political order that treats Iraqi minorities humanely, allowing them free political and cultural expression within the context of the region's existing states.

Background to U.S. Policy Options

Any proposed policy must acknowledge the background of the Kurdish question in Iraq, a background that for the United States at least can be traced to the international environment after World War I.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Allied Powers tried to partition the remains of the Turkish state between themselves and various ethnic groups in the region. One of these ethnic groups was the Kurds, who inhabited a largely mountainous region that is now shared by Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. According to the Treaty of Sevres, which was imposed on the Ottoman sultan in 1921, an independent Kurdish state was to be formed out of the southeastern quarter of what is now Turkey.

The Allies' plans fell apart, however, when Turkish nationalist leader Kemal Ataturk deposed the sultan and forced the Allies to renegotiate their terms. Under the new treaty of Lausanne, which was signed in 1923, the new Turkish republic absorbed what would have been the Kurdish state, while the rest of Kurdistan was divided between Iran and the French and British mandate territories of Syria and Mesopotamia. In the decades to come, the Kurds periodically rebelled against Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian rule, but to little lasting effect.[2] By the late 1950s, however, the stage was set for the problems that now face American policy makers.

In 1958 Mustafa Barzani became a leader of the KDP, the oldest of the Kurdish political factions in Iraq. His chief rival in the KDP was Jalal Talabani, who eventually broke with Barzani in the 1960s and at first collaborated with the Iraqi government to unseat Barzani. This being unsuccessful, in 1975 Talabani contented himself by forming his own political group, the PUK. When Barzani died in 1979 in the United States, his son Masoud assumed the leadership of the KDP, a position he still holds today.[3]

With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, both factions took an active part in the fighting. The KDP, for instance, supported Iran, and it even "at times acted almost as an advance unit for its attacking armies." By contrast, the PUK tried to use the war to extract political concessions from Baghdad, but it abandoned this approach in 1984 and made gestures at reconciliation with the KDP. In 1987 Masoud Barzani and Talabani formed a coalition movement known as the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, its goals being to topple Hussein's regime and to replace it with a democratic government that would grant the Kurds "federal status."[4]

Hussein responded with the first of his now-infamous chemical weapons attacks on Kurdish villages, culminating in the gas attack on Halabja in March 1988 that killed 6,000 villagers. Along with international outrage, the attacks also provoked a refugee crisis as hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled for safety to Turkey and Iran,[5] a foretaste of the massive movement of Kurdish refugees following the Gulf War.

Three years later, when Saddam's attempted conquest of Kuwait ended in military disaster, the Kurds struck back. All of Iraqi Kurdistan rose in rebellion, and for a moment it appeared that Saddam's dictatorship would collapse. However, the U.S.-led coalition that had defeated Iraq refrained from supporting the rebellion, allowing Baghdad to mount a counteroffensive to retake the north. When this provoked a flood of almost 2 million refugees escaping into Turkey and Iran, the West finally intervened, establishing a United Nations-protected zone in extreme northern Iraq and a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel that prohibited Baghdad from using air power against Kurds in that area.[6]

These measures halted Saddam's attacks, leaving behind a political vacuum in northern Iraq that began to be filled by the Kurds themselves. Under the auspices of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, the KDP and the PUK sponsored elections in May 1992 that created a parliament and the so-called Kurdistan Regional Government. The Kurds' embryonic government then "declared its ultimate intention of becoming a federal state within a future post-Saddam [Hussein], democratic, Iraq." Equally encouraging, the KDP and the PUK apparently set aside their long-standing enmity to build a viable political structure for the Kurds. Barzani, for example, claimed that "it pleases me to assert that all affairs are managed now as if the two were a single party.Ó Similarly, his rival Talabani noted that Òcooperation ... has been strengthened to the extent that opinions have developed within their ranks, even at leadership levels, calling for unifying these two parties."[7] Such displays of amity did not last long.

In late 1993 a debate between the two factions over customs duties turned into armed conflict that led to the PUK's capture of the Kurdish parliament in the city of Irbil. Various foreign powers, such as France, Turkey, Iran and the United States, attempted throughout 1994 to broker an agreement between Barzani and Talabani. Meeting at Paris in July, representatives of the factions developed a draft constitution and reached an accord whereby "Iraqi Kurdistan shall be administered by a democratic system that will guarantee pluralism, respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights of the national and religious minorities." Barzani and Talabani never left Iraq to sign the Paris agreement, however, because of Turkish fears that it would lead to the establishment of a Kurdish state, which in turn would be a powerful stimulant to the separatist sentiments of Turkey's Kurds. Thus Ankara refused to allow Barzani and Talabani to cross its border, and the Paris accord languished.[8]

Even so, KDP-PUK negotiations continued into the summer and fall of 1994, reaching a "Strategic Agreement" in November. The document denounced the continuing factional strife in the strongest possible terms: "...the fighting between PUK and KDP is a suicide act for both parties and the annihilation of the Kurdistan liberation movement as well as a waste of our people's achievement. It discredits the reputation of the two parties and the Kurdish movement regionally and internationally." Despite this warning, the fighting intensified into December 1994.[9] Vigorous diplomatic activity on the part of the United States and Britain resulted in a cease-fire in April 1995, but by July the fighting had resumed. In August the United States, now acting as a mediator, tried and failed to secure another cease-fire; an Iranian attempt in October and a third American effort in November also foundered.[10] Finally in September 1996 the civil war reached its climax as Barzani concluded an alliance with the Kurds' archenemy, Saddam Hussein, to eliminate the PUK as a viable political force. By mid-September, Iraqi and KDP forces had shattered Talabani's hold on Irbil and other Kurdish cities, driving his fighters into Iran and reasserting Baghdad's influence over northern Iraq.

Saddam's incursion clearly caught the Administration by surprise. After the punitive cruise missile strike, President Clinton revealed how little he thought the United States could do about the crisis: "Our ability to control internal events in Iraq is limited. I would still like to-to do more to help the Kurds. But frankly, if you want the fighting to-for the fighting to be ended, the leaders of the various factions are going to have to be willing to go back to the peace table and talk it through."[11]

Clearly the United States needs a new policy to address the political conditions of northern Iraq and the Kurds. What follows are the most viable options that the Administration can pursue.

American Policy Options

Option I: The first and simplest option for the United States is to do nothing, to allow events in Iraqi Kurdistan to take their course without interference from Washington. To some extent, this is the policy the Administration has pursued since September, but this hands-off attitude has the potential for serious dangers to American interests in the Middle East.

As mentioned earlier, one possible consequence of such a policy is that it could strengthen Saddam Hussein's prestige in the region at the expense of our own. A situation could then easily develop in which Saddam is emboldened to challenge U.S. policy in other areas, encouraging the Administration to adopt an inflexible attitude on Iraqi issues that may need adjustment, so as to avoid the impression that American policy is "knuckling underÓ to Saddam's threats.

A good example is the growing concern amongst our European and Arab allies over the wisdom of continuing the trade sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War. French diplomat Eric Rouleau has cogently argued, "By their scope, rigorous implementation and devastating effects on the economy and Iraqis' living and health standards and social fabric, the sanctions run the risk--despite Western intentions to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity--of undermining the Iraqi state and, consequently, other shaky states in the region."[12] The Administration will likely resist international pressure to lift sanctions on Iraq, fearing that this would be interpreted by Saddam and other troublesome regimes as a lack of American resolve. The irony, of course, is that the sanctions impact all Iraqis, including those same Kurds whom we sought to protect from Saddam. As a result, Kurdish economic activity before the Iraqi incursions of September was severely restricted, aggravating the political conflict between the KDP and the PUK that American diplomats were trying to defuse.[13]

The other consequence of this policy option is its effect on Turkey. Long seen as a pillar of stability in the Middle East, Turkey faces a "slow-motion catastrophe"[14] in the form of Kurdish separatism. When Saddam's control over Iraqi Kurdistan dissolved in 1991 and the Kurdish Regional Government was formed in its stead, Kurds in Turkey could not fail to notice the example being set by their Iraqi counterparts. Nor could Ankara stand by as PKK guerrillas used the political vacuum to launch raids on Turkey from Iraqi soil.[15] To deal with the PKK, Turkey has conducted a series of raids on Iraqi Kurdistan, the largest and most recent incursion taking place in April-May 1995. Along with further destabilizing the area, the raids have "led to criticism by the United States and threats from Europe, where Turkey's newly negotiated customs union with the European Union was immediately jeopardized.... Clearly the Turks were willing to risk hard-won gains in Europe to destroy the PKK sanctuaries in northern Iraq."[16]

Turkey's struggle with Kurdish separatism has had important effects on its foreign policy in apparently unrelated areas. Commentators point out that it has "restricted severely Turkey's ability to play a strong role, even diplomatically in the Balkans (especially in the Bosnian conflict) in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia."[17] The inability of Turkey to fully participate in such regional issues can only diminish our own capacity to influence events in a direction favorable to American interests. Thus a policy of non-involvement is imprudent at this time.

Option II: A second course open to the Administration is a revival of the peace talks between Barzani and Talabani. If successful, the Kurds would once again form a united front against Saddam and thereby weaken or dislodge his hold on northern Iraq. This policy has certain attractions, the greatest being the prospect of ending the KDP-PUK conflict and encouraging the growth of democratic institutions in the region. The likelihood that the U.S. would succeed, however, seems slim.

A basic stumbling block of this option is the Kurds themselves, who do not comprise a united and homogenous group. They are divided in so many ways--linguistic, religious, political and social--that any attempt to get all factions to reconcile their differences would probably be futile. "Though they have a sense of nationhood and a generalized solidarity," notes one observer, "their feudal, tribal, linguistic and religious divisions still outweigh their sense of Kurdishness."[18] In addition, the political fissures in Kurdish society "work against a viable Kurdish nationalism that the people of northern Iraq can share."[19]

Complicating matters still further is that any American attempt to bring the Kurds closer together would doubtless be opposed by some or all of the states that occupy Kurdistan. "The Kurds still suffer ... from the skill their neighbors and rulers show in dividing and ruling," note commentators,[20] and there is no reason not to expect Saddam Hussein to exploit the divisions within Iraqi Kurdistan and unravel American efforts at reconciliation. More significantly, it also fails to address the Kurdish issue directly, especially as regards the future political status of the Kurds in both Iraq and Turkey.

Option III: Another policy the United States can pursue is to increase economic, political and military pressure on Baghdad until it withdraws from northern Iraq. Such a policy would be consistent with previous American actions, such as the cruise missile attack of last September, and it would enjoy widespread domestic support so long as U.S. ground forces were not significantly involved. This approach, while perhaps psychologically satisfying for American public opinion, has serious flaws as well.

Any move to tighten or impose additional economic sanctions on Iraq will meet strong opposition from our Gulf War allies in Europe and the Middle East. The French, for instance, already view the logic behind the sanctions now in place as "irrational," pointing out that these "draconian measures ... have no precedent in the post-World War II era, even though Iraq is not the only country to have been guilty of grave crimes." American allies in the Middle East, most notably Turkey, feel "betrayed" by the U.S. because of the heavy price they have paid by respecting the sanctions: By 1995 the embargo had cost the Turks $10 billion-$20 billion, with little or no compensation from the United States. As for the Gulf states (besides Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), America's "direct involvement in the defense of their security, at the slightest alarm, embarrasses them and costs them dearly..."[21]

Imposing new sanctions as a way to pressure Iraq would be easier if the United States strictly adhered to the conditions set by the United Nations for lifting those that already exist. The embargo on sales of Iraqi oil, for example, was to be ended when Saddam complied with U.N. resolutions requiring the destruction of Iraq's nonconventional weapons and the installation of a monitoring system to prevent future rearmament. When Iraq did so, the U.S. unilaterally declared that all sanctions would remain in force until Baghdad implemented all U.N. resolutions. Justification for this attitude was offered by Madeleine Albright, our ambassador to the U.N. and now nominee for Secretary of State: "We recognize this area [the Persian Gulf] as vital to U.S. national interests, and we will behave with others multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must."[22]

Such a stance creates difficulties, however. French diplomat Eric Rouleau asks, "What are the 'vital interests' that the United States must defend, come what may? Are they different from those of the other great democracies? Should not each of these states have the right to interpret and apply an international decision as it sees fit? In these circumstances, how can the cohesion and the credibility of the United Nations and the Security Council be preserved?"[23]
Even anti-Saddam groups in Iraq now oppose continuation of the sanctions. One such group, which represents the Shiite population of southern Iraq, says that "Saddam Hussein has been the Number One violator of human rights in Iraq, but the sanctions are in fact now causing more deaths and suffering than the regime itself... [I]f the U.S. cannot or will not help the Iraqis to remove Saddam Hussein, then it must not prolong their suffering and damage their country in the 'indefinite sanctions alone' policy."[24]

An additional problem is the growing belief amongst critics of the sanctions that they are being kept in force by the U.S. to aid American economic interests, not to help overthrow Saddam. Some of these critics argue that one of the purposes of the ban on Iraqi oil sales is to prevent world oil prices from dropping, thus making it easier for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to repay their $30 billion debt to the U.S. Furthermore, "lower oil prices would increase the competitiveness of the two major U.S. economic rivals: Germany and Japan..."[25] According to other international observers, "All measures taken by the U.S. against Iraq so far are exclusively designed to contain Iraq's threat to the region but not to free the Iraq people from the horrors of Saddam Hussein. ...the old misconception has prevailed yet again amongst U.S. policy makers: a weak Saddam is a better choice than a free Iraq..."[26]

Adopting a punitive approach toward resolving the question of Iraq's Kurds is thus unlikely to be fruitful in the long run. Sanctions, political pressure and military attacks can continue only so long, and in the process we will have expended a good deal of our political capital in an effort that leaves the fundamental issues unaddressed. While this option may be appealing on the surface, it is really little more than a costly diversion.

Option IV: The last option we will consider entails considerable political risk for the United States and its allies, but it also holds the greatest chance for bringing about a stable political system for the Kurds that in turn reduces the pressures placed on countries like Turkey. This policy contains three fundamental elements:

1) Aid to one of the Iraqi Kurdish factions that enables it to become the preeminent political force in the region, eventually becoming powerful enough to depose Saddam Hussein;
2) Clear articulation of the U.S. goal that Iraq remain a united state, but possessing a federal structure that guarantees political, religious and cultural freedom for all Iraqis;
3) High-level dialogue with Turkey that persuades it to adopt a federal political structure for itself that frees Turkish Kurds from the threat of repression. Once such a system is in place, the separatist impulse in southeastern Turkey will be permanently defused.

To implement the first element of this policy, the Administration needs to select a faction to support, which would either be the KDP or the PUK. Given the KDP's alliance with Saddam against the PUK, it is tempting to advocate that U.S. support go to the PUK. However, we should in fact support the KDP instead, for it is the oldest of the Kurdish factions and the one with the greatest amount of prestige and the largest following. In addition, if the United States can induce Barzani to abandon his alliance with Saddam, Baghdad's grip on northern Iraq will be gravely weakened. In pursuing this policy, the United States must support the KDP to such an extent that it can either defeat or absorb all rival factions, especially the PUK.

This of course runs counter to the American ideal of promoting political pluralism and democracy, but it must be recognized that this ideal has no chance at present of flourishing in Iraqi Kurdistan. "...when discussing how the Kurds can build their democracy," one observer comments, "we must come to grips with three basic problems: primordial loyalties, proliferation of guns and armed militias, and the disastrous economic situation. Each one of these problems is enough to prevent the institution of a Kurdish democracy. Together they make it impossible."[27] It must also be understood that our objective is not to create a democratic Kurdistan; it is to create a stable Kurdistan. Only when stability is introduced to the region will democratic ideas be able to take root.

In order to further aid the KDP, the United States should then assist and encourage the KDP to carry the struggle against Saddam to Baghdad, with the result that the regime is destroyed. In its place we should support the establishment of a government ruled for the immediate future by the KDP, with the provision that the KDP will not attempt to grant independence to Iraqi Kurdistan. Instead, it should be understood by Barzani that the United States advocates the creation of a new federal system for Iraq that limits the power of the central government and guarantees political freedom for all Iraqi minorities.

This policy cannot and should not be pursued unilaterally, for it is of the utmost importance that all parties concerned--the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi Shiites, the Turkish Kurds and the Turkish government understand exactly what American intentions are. It is clear the policy cannot succeed without the support of Ankara, and the United States must therefore address Turkish concerns about the specter of a Kurdish uprising that topples an established government.
The essential first step is to encourage Turkey to adopt a federal-style government that allows Turkish Kurds the freedom to wear their own dress, speak their own language, form political parties that represent their interests, and so on. Decentralization is not an alien concept in Turkish politics.

Indeed, former Turkish president Turgut Ozal believed before his untimely death several years ago that "decentralization measures would be necessary to preserve the unity of the Turkish republic--just as the Ottomans had preserved their empire for centuries by allowing its constituent ethnic and religious groups a large measure of cultural and administrative autonomy."[28] Such a move would also be in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne that legitimized the Turkish state, which stated that "No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use of any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings."[29]

And what of the Kurds themselves? Would they be willing to forego independence in favor of autonomy? "Most observers agree," says Eric Rouleau, "that even those who claim the right to independence would settle for what would be considered normal democratic rights in the West..."[30] If this is true, then it may indeed be possible to defuse the destabilizing influence of Kurdish separatism in Turkey, returning Ankara to its traditional position as a pillar of stability in the Middle East.

This proposed policy has its dangers, of course, not the least of which would be the ramifications of failure. There is no way to guarantee that the KDP would refrain from declaring independence once Saddam was overthrown, and the Turks would surely respond with a renewed invasion of northern Iraq. This time, however, two American allies would be fighting each other with American weapons and American money--the very definition of a foreign policy disaster. Nor is there any guarantee that the KDP would be able to prevent Iraq from splitting apart once Saddam was overthrown, thereby allowing Iranian influence to enter, especially in the south. In short, this is a policy with serious risks.

Even so, it remains the best policy to pursue, as it takes a long-term view of the problems in northern Iraq and attempts to create a stable political order in a region that harbors vital American interests. Just as the dangers of failure are great, so are the rewards if it is carried out successfully. A reformed and stable Iraqi state will be a formidable bulwark against Iranian fundamentalist influence, as well as an important break in the tradition of dictatorial Arab states. Although our chances of successfully implementing this policy are probably less certain than they were when Saddam retook northern Iraq, the stakes are sufficiently high and the potential benefits sufficiently great that the Administration should give this policy proposal serious consideration.

End Notes
[1] Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," Foreign Affairs 72, 5 (November-December 1993), p. 122.
[2] Michael Collins Dunn, "The Kurdish 'Question': Is There an Answer? A Historical Overview," Middle East Policy 4 (September 1995), pp. 76-78.
[3] Ibid., pp. 80-81.
[4] Michael M. Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq," Middle East Journal (Spring 1996), pp. 231-32.
[5] Dunn, p. 81.
[6] Ibid., p. 82; James M. Prince, "A Kurdish State in Iraq?" Current History 92 (January 1993), p. 17.
[7] Gunter, p. 226.
[8] Ibid., pp. 233-34.
[9] Ibid., pp. 237-38.
[10] Ibid., pp. 238-39.
[11] Bradley Graham and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Aids Some Kurds, but Not Those in Anti-Saddam Group," The Washington Post, 10 September, 1996, p. A21.
[12] Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq," Foreign Affairs 74, 1 (January-February 1995), p. 63.
[13] Prince, p. 22; Gunter, p. 240.
[14] Rouleau, "Challenges," p. 122.
[15] Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," International Affairs 69, 4 (1993), p. 674.
[16] Dunn, p. 79.
[17] Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies Since the Gulf War," Middle East Policy IV, 3 (March 1996), p. 117.
[18] Dunn, pp. 74-76.
[19] Gunter, p. 240.
[20] Dunn, p. 85.
[21] Rouleau, "America's," pp. 60, 62-63, 70.
[22] Ibid., pp. 66-67.
[23] Ibid., p. 67.
[24] Ibid., p. 69.
[25] Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question Four Years On: The Policies of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy 3, 3 (1994), p. 143.
[26] Rouleau, "America's," p. 69.
[27] Gunter, p. 240.
[28] Rouleau, "Challenges," p. 123.
[29] Robins, "Overlord," p. 660, n. 13.
[30] Rouleau, "Challenges," p. 123.